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CoMMTs
MANDATORY MATERNITY LEAVES AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
In 1971, Mrs. Jo Carol La Fleur and Mrs. Ann Elizabeth Nelson
were each forced to discontinue their employment because of the
Cleveland School Board regulation prohibiting teachers from working
after the end of their third month of pregnancy.' Each teacher
brought an action against the school board under the Civil Bights
Act of 1871,2 claiming that these maternity regulations unconstitution-
1 Mrs. La Fleur expected her baby in mid-July. Nevertheless, she was
notified that her maternity leave, which she had never requested, would be
effective "from March 12, 1971 to the end of the 1970-71 school year and to
include the first semester of the 1971-72 school year." Mrs. La Fleur's repeated
requests to be allowed to continue teaching beyond March 12 were denied. Brief
for Appellant at 4-5, La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th
Cir. 1972).
The details of the regulation applying to Mrs. La Fleur state:
Any married teacher who becomes pregnant and who desires to return
to the employ of the Board at a future date may be granted a maternity
leave of absence without pay.
APPLICATION A maternity leave of absence shall be effective not less
than five (5) months before the expected date of the normal birth of the
child. Application for such leave shall be forwarded to the Superinten-
dent at least two (2) weeks before the effective date of the leave of
absence. A leave of absence without pay shall be granted by the Superin-
tendent for a period not to exceed two (2) years.
REASSIGNMENT A teacher may return to service from maternity
leaves not earlier than the beginning of the regular school semester
which follows the child's age of three (3) months. In unusual circum-
stances, exceptions to this requirement may be made by the Superinten-
dent with the approval of the Board. Written request for return to service
from maternity leave must reach the Superintendent at least six (6)
weeks prior to the beginning of the semester when the teacher expects
to resume teaching and shall be accompanied by a doctor's certificate
stating the health and physical condition of the teacher. The Superinten-
dent may require an additional physical examination.
When a teacher qualifies to return from maternity leave, she shall have
priority in reassignment to a vacancy for which she is qualified under her
certificate, but she will not have prior claim to the exact position she
held before the leave of absence became effective.
Effective February 1, 1971, no maternity leaves were to be granted to
teachers employed less than one continuous year. Instead, such teachers would
be asked to resign. Mrs. Nelson, expecting her baby in August, was accordingly
asked to resign as of five months before the expected delivery date, i.e., March
26, 1971. Id. at 6-7.
For a discussion of maternity leave policies, see Comment, 45 TEMT. L.Q.
240 (1972).
2 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)) which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State of Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of an rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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ally discriminated on the basis of sex.3 The relief sought was an
injunction against implementation of the regulation and reinstate-
ment with back pay.4 Coming before the district court in April of
1971, the two cases were tried together due to the identical nature
of the issues presented. 5 The trial court held for the defendants,
finding the regulation reasonable and non-discriminatory. 6 A year
later, the appellate court found the regulation "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable in its overbreadth."
7
In order to comprehend this difference in holdings, one must first
understand traditional judicial treatment of the equal protection
clause. 8 In bringing suit under this clause, the plaintiff must establish
3 The equal protection argument with regard to maternity leaves may be
summarized as follows:
1. pregnancy is a condition unique to the female sex;
2. pregnancy is not unlike other medical conditions in regard to its effects
on an individual's ability to work;
3. to single out pregnant teachers for different treatment than teachers
with other medical conditions, therefore, is to discriminate on the basis
of sex;
4. since this singling out of pregnant teachers from other teachers has
no underlying rational basis, it amounts to a denial of equal protection
under law.
See, e.g., Brief for the Women's Equity Action League as Amicus Curiae at 4;
Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 7; Brief for the
National Educational Association as Amicus Curiae at 21-22. See also Schattman
v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328, 329 (W.D. Tex. 1971):
By virtue of female physiology, the Defendant's policy applies solely to
women. Women are terminated not because of their unwillingness to
continue work, their poor performance, or their need for personal
medical safety, but because of a condition attendant to their sex.
4 La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1185 (6th Cir. 1972).
5 La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 826 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (N.D. Ohio
1971). Comment, 40 U. CrNN. L. REv. 857 (1971).
6 La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 826 F. Supp. 1208, 1214 (N.D. Ohio
1971).
7tSee La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir.
1972).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states in part "No state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Enacted in post-
Civil War America, the amendment as a whole was directed toward securing
rights for the freedman. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
See also Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065,
1066 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
The broad language of the amendment, however, was soon applied to groups
other than the ex-slaves, such as California's oriental residents. See, e.g., Yiek
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 856 (1886); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703
(1884); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). More recent cases extending
protection to aliens include: Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (over-
turning Arizona's residency requirement for welfare recipients); Takahashi v.
Fish & Game Conun'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (overturning a California statute
barring commercial fishing licenses to individuals ineligible for citizenship).
Not all groups have been successful in their litigation under the equal pro-
tection clause. See, e.g., Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH.
(Continued on next Me)
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that he was denied equal protection under law by a party acting with
state sanction.9 Since the regulation challenged in the present case
had been issued pursuant to state statute,'0 there was no contest
regarding the question of "state action." The litigation focused, rather,
on the reasonableness of the regulatory classification and on the issue
of what standard to apply in testing the regulation's constitutionality.
The Cleveland Board of Education argued that the only applicable
standard was the "reasonable basis test."" Under this test, a classifica-
tion "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relationship to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike." 2 Furthermore:
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against that clause merely because it is not made with math-
ematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain
it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
L. REv. 477 (1967); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871
[hereinafter cited as Brown, Equal Rights]. But see also Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968), on remand 216 So.2d 818 (1968) (illegitimate children are
"persons" within meaning of equal protection clause).
9 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1 states: "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." (emphasis added). The term, state, has been liberally construed
by the courts. See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968) (shopping center serving public function); Burton V. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state agency leasing to restaurant which
practiced discrimination); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (Democratic
association controlling election machinery); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants); and Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company-min town).
That any action taken by a local board of education is "state action" has
not been widely questioned. Alston v. School Board, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.
1940), does explain the connecting principles, however. See also Dunham v.
Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D.C. Vt. 1970).
10 Omno R~v. CODE: § 3313.20 (1972), cited in La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 326 F. Supp. 1208,1211 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
"1 For detaile discussion of this test, see Brown Equal Rights, supra note 8;
Developments, supra note 8. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655
(1969) (Harlan dissenting).2 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also Mc-
Donald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 806-10 (1968); Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 67 (1911); Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27, 31-32 (1885).
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the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable
basis, but is essentially arbitrary.' 3
In short, the "reasonable basis test" calls for judicial deference to
legislative and administrative judgment.
The alternate standard, in contrast, accords no presumption of
constitutionality to a challenged rule. In effect, therefore, it places
the burden on the defendant to justify differential treatment This
"strict scrutiny" or "compelling state interest test," however, has only
been applied under the following limited circumstances: (1) where
there is possible infringement of a "fundamental right" or (2)
where the classification made is "suspect."' 4
As Justice Harlan once noted, this standard, although an exception,
possesses a potential for swallowing the entire equal protection rule,
since virtually every state action interferes with someone's "funda-
mental rights."15 In practice, however, the fundamental rights aspect
of the compelling state interest test has been of limited utility to
plaintiffs, partly due to judicial reluctance to rely on it. Where alleged
violations have involved voting rights, 6 criminal appeals,' 7 or educa-
tion,'8 the federal courts have frequently applied a strict standard of
review, but this has not been so in cases concerning other rights.19
Moreover, even where the strict standard has been applied, it is
apparent that reliance on the due process clause instead would
probably have resulted in similar holdings. Perhaps the greatest
hindrance, however, is that the courts have been no more successful
in articulating a formula to distinguish fundamental rights from other
rights under the equal protection clause, than they had been under
the due process clause.
2 0
13 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). See
also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.
457, 463-64 (1957); Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134, 136 (D.D.C. 1970).
14 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-61 (1969).
15 Id. at 661.
16 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Election, 383 U.S. 663, 665-67 (1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
17Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956). Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
I8 Brown v. Bd. of Education., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967).
19 See, e.g., Russo v. Shapiro, 309 F. Supp. 385, 392-93 (D.C. Conn. 1969)
(denying that the compelling state interest test should be used in matters of
welfare rights).20 It is likely that any right found fundamental under the due process clause
would also be fundamental for purposes of the equal protection clause. (The
reverse is not necessarily so.) The old "ordered liberty approach" to these rights
is developed in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). The theory of
"selective incorporation" is expounded in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968). For a summary of Supreme Court decisions in this area, see Frankfurter
(Continued on next page)
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Despite these many weaknesses of the fundamental rights ap-
proach, plaintiffs and five amici curiae21 in La Fleur relied on it,
asserting that the compelling state interest standard was required,
due to interference with the teachers' rights to work22 and raise a
family.23 Plaintiffs and amici curiae also argued that the compelling
state interest standard was necessitated by the regulatory formula-
tion of a "suspect" classification based on sex.24
To date, only the California Supreme Court has clearly labeled
sex as a "suspect" criterion for differential treatment. In Sairer Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby,25 this court applied the compelling state interest test
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Memorandum on "Incorporation' of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HAnv. L. 11v. 746 (1965).
21Amici curiae were: 'The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); Inter-
national Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America (UAW); The National Educational Association (NEA); The
United States Equal Protection Opportunity Commission (EEOC); and The
Women's Equity Action League (WEAL).
22 SeBrief for Appellant supra note 1, at 13. Cases discussin the right
to work include: Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (196s~7); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915);
Keenan v. Bd. of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Ratti
v. Hindsdale Raceway, Inc., 249 A.2d 859 (N.H. 1969). But see Orr v. Trinter,
444 F.2d 128, 134 (6th Cir. 1971) (denying that there is a constitutional right
to public employment.)
The trial court in La Fleur denied that the rights of the teachers were a
fundamental concern, suggesting instead that the right of the students to an
education was far more important. 326 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (1971). The
appellate court did not even consider whether the right to work was "fundamen-
tal," but cited instead Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952), which
stated:
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public em-
ployment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does
extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is
patently arbitrary or discriminatory. La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 1972).
23 Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 13. Cases discussing the right to
marry and/or to raise a family include: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390,399 (1923).
24Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 15-17. On the issue of sex-based
discrimination as "suspect," see Note, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally
Suspect?, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 480 (1971).
25 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339-41, 485 P.2d 529, 539-41 (1971). In justifying its
use of the compelling state interest test, the court stated:
Laws which disable women from full participation in the political,
business and economic arenas are often characterized as "protective"
and beneficial. Those same laws applied to racial or ethnic minorities
would readily be recognized as invidious and impermissible ... We
conclude that the sexual classifications are properly treated as suspect,
particularly when those classifications are made with respect to a
damental interest such as employment. Id. at 341, 485 P.2d at 541.
It should be noted that this is directly contradictory to the position taken by
the United States Supreme Court regarding the same law in Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948).
See also Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593,
(Continued on next page)
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to a statute prohibiting most women from tending bar, and found
the statute in conflict with the equal protection clause. While the
United States Supreme Court over the past decade has consistently
held classifications based on race, alienage, or national origin to be
"suspect,"26 it has never so held with respect to classifications based
on sex. In fact, until the recent decision in Reed v. Reed,27 the Court
had upheld every statute it examined which conferred different
treatment according to sex.
28
This double standard2 9 in judicial construction of the equal pro-
tection clause may be traced to the philosophies prevalent in nine-
teenth-century America. In 1872, the Court reinforced the concept
that a woman's place was in the home by upholding Illinois' refusal
to permit women to practice law.30 As the concurring opinion
phrased it:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belong to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life....
The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which
belong [sic] . . .to the family institution is repugnant to the idea
of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from
that of her husband.... The paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator .... 31
From the nineteenth century until the present day, variations on
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
605 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) which held a tavern's refusal of service to women to be a
denial of equal protection. The court in this case did not apply the compelling
state interest test; neither did it apply the McGowan-Doud reasonable basis test.
Rather it applied the "new reasonable basis test." See infra note 41 for other
cases taking this middle-of-the-road approach.
20The landmark case establishing classifications based on race as "suspect"
was Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967), further expressed this principle.
Distinctions based on alienage or national ancestry were contested soon after
the equal protection clause was enacted. See note 8 supra. The first case to clearly
enunciate the principle that distinctions based on race were suspect, however,
was Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
27404 U.S. 71 (1971). Relying on the reasonable basis test, the Court over-
turned an Idaho statute expressing preference for males as administrators of
estates. Despite appellants' request that the compelling state interest test be
applied, the Court never considered this issue. See Comment, 25 VArN. L. 1_Ev.
412 (1972).28 Comment, 25 VAaN. L. RLv. 412 415 (1972).
29 Eastwood, The Double Standards of Justice: Women's Rights Under the
Constitution, 5 VAL. U.L. REv. 281 (1970).
30 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872). Note that this case
was decided under the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
31 Id. at 141 (J. Bradley, concurring opinion). See also In re Lockwood,
154 U.S. 116 (1894).
[Vol. 61
CoN2As
this philosophy have continued to serve as justification for unequal
treatment of the sexes. In its 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon,32
for example, the Court upheld a statute limiting the working hours
of women, on the ground that the physical and moral protection of
women was a legitimate end for legislation.
33
Considered against the background of the horrid working con-
ditions of the early twentieth century, this decision appears beneficent
for the Court was actually mandating discrimination in favor of
women.34 The underlying circumstances were forgotten in later
years, though, and Muller v. Oregon came to stand for the simple
proposition that classifications based on sex are valid unless shown to
be clearly arbitrary. Indeed, later decisions not only neglected to
consider the circumstances present in 1908 justifying the Muller
decision, but actually cited that case in upholding statutes dis-
criminating against women. One example is the 1948 decision in
Goesaert v. Cleary,35 in which the Court upheld a Michigan statute
prohibiting women other than wives and daughters of bar owners
from becoming barmaids. Undoubtedly aware of the criticism this
holding would evoke, Justice Frankfurter remarked: "[T]he Con-
stitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight,
or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep
abreast of the latest scientific standards."36 Still bound by such
sentiments more than a decade later, the Court dealt another blow
to women's struggle for equality through its decision in Hoyt v.
Florida,37 upholding a statute which exempted from jury duty all
women who did not volunteer.
Despite such continued judicial reluctance to recognize that
females of the mid-century were a different breed than those of earlier
decades, the President's Commission on the Status of Women took the
position that women would achieve full equality via the fifth and
fourteenth amendments in the near future.38  Due to numerous
32 208 U.S. 412 (1908). This case is discussed in L. KAowrrz, WoMN AN~D
T LAw: THE UNFINIS REvOLUTION 152-53 (1969); Kanowitz, Constitutional
Aspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, 48 NEB. L. Iav. 131, 135-36
(1968).
33 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908). Cf. Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which a similar law applicable to bakery workers of both
sexes was overturned on the grounds that it interfered with freedom of contract.
34 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908). Referring to the female
sex, the Court stated: ". . . legislation designed for her protection may be
sustained. .. ." The Court spoke fuirther of the design "to compensate [Woman]
for some of the burdens which rest upon her."
35 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
36 Id. at 466.
z368 U.S. 57 (1961).
38 See Brown, Equal Rights, supra note 8, at 877.
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other new decisions perpetuating the ghost of Muller v. Oregon,39
the outlook for success nevertheless remained poor. While racial
classifications had been firmly established as "suspect,"40 sex classifica-
tions continued to be permitted under the equal protection clause,
as long as they rested on a "reasonable basis."
A subtle change in focus became apparent in the late sixties,
however, when some courts claiming reliance on the old reasonable
basis test overturned regulations according differential treatment on
the grounds of sex.41 In reality, these courts were applying a "new
39 Among the recent cases citing the Muller decision as good law is Johnson
v. Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1971). Jones Metal Prod. Co. v.
Walker, 267 N.E.2d 814, 822 (Ohio App. 1971), cited Muller as good law, but
was reversed upon appeal on the ground that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
preempted the field of discriminatory employment practices by virtue of the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 281 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ohio
1972). United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), while
not citing Muller v. Oregon, does cite Goesaert v. Cleary in upholding the
exemption of women from the armed forces-"[M]en must provide the first line
of defense while women keep the home fires burning."
40 See note 16 supra.
41 Most of these actions arose under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, (Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title V31, § 701) [codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)], and thus, have no direct bearing on judicial treatment
of the equal protection clause in cases involving sex-based classifications. By the
late sixties, however, perhaps due to stimulation from the Title VII decisions,
several courts found discriminatory regulations regarding women to be uncon-
stitutional under the equal protection clause. See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) (striking down a statute
allowing longer sentences for women than for men guilty of the same offense).
Note that while the court cites Muller v. Oregon as an example of permissible
judicial deference, it refuses to defer to the legislature itself, and more rigidly
scrutinizes the challenged statute than courts were willing to do under the old
reasonable basis test. Kanowitz, supra note 31, at 171 states: "In sum, the
Robinson decision reiterated the classic test, . . .but held that burden . . .was
heavier on the state where the classification was of women as a group and
resulted in a deprivation of personal liberty ... " See contra, supra note 5, at
865, which states that the court applied the compelling state interest test.
See also Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593,
605 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. Ala. 1966).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), may also be an example of this new
approach to the traditional reasonable basis test. Reply Brief for EEOC as
Amicus Curiae, La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th
Cir. 1972), cites Reed as an example of this new approach which does not
permit the kind of assumptions allowed under Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
1948), and Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
In Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va.
1971), rev'd, F.2d (4th Cir. 1973) decided only days after the
appellate decision in the La Fleur case a similar maternity regulation was struck
down. Claiming to apply the "reasonable basis test," the lower court found that
no facts existed to justify the regulation. It should be noted that in mid-January
of 1973 the Cohen decision was reversed on appeal. Ultimately, therefore, the
Supreme Court may have to determine which federal court of appeals correctly
analyzed the constitutional issues raised by mandatory maternity leave policies.
Here, as in the La Fleur appellate decision, the district court refused to indulge
in any presumptions of constitutionality or defer to the decision of the school
(Continued on next page)
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reasonable basis test." Traditionally, courts accorded challenged
statutes a presumption of constitutionality which could be overturned
only if the plaintiff established that the classification in question bore
no reasonable relation to any of the possible legitimate purposes of
the statute. Under the new version of this test, the court accords
no presumption of constitutionality to a statute, but rather weighs
the merits of the goals supported by the statutory classification against
the gravity of the rights infringed upon by that classification. This
results in recognition of the deprivation incurred by a statute, although
without as much protection for personal rights frustrated through
sex discrimination as would be provided under the compelling state
interest test.
Returning to the question initially posed-what standard should
be applied in evaluating the Cleveland school board's maternity leave
policy?-we find three acceptable alternatives: the compelling state
interest test; the traditional reasonable basis test; the "new reasonable
basis test." Precedent overwhelmingly supports application of the
traditional test, as does the Supreme Court decision in Reed v. Reed,42
a sex discrimination case decided while the La Fleur appeal was
pending. In La Fleur, the trial court applied that test and found the
classification of teachers into "pregnant females" and "others" to be
reasonable in light of the expressed purposes of protecting teachers
and maintaining classroom continuity. 43 The holding was vacated
upon appeal, however.
44
To the extent the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals based its
decision on the fact-finding errors of the lower court, it appeared to
be holding that even under the traditional test the regulation was
unjustified. Specifically, this court found that a teacher's pregnancy
would no more tend to disrupt classroom continuity and order than
any other medical condition would.45 Furthermore, teaching past the
third month of pregnancy was unlikely to be harmful to either mother
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
board. In effect, then, the court was abandoning the traditional reasonable basis
standard in an effort to come to grips with the social and scientific realities of
today. (Note the courts citation of Douglas v. California and Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Educ. as recent expressions of the equal protection standard.) The decisions
in Cohen and La Fleur contrast sharply with earlier judicial willingness to
recognize administrative efficiency as a valid basis for upholding mandatory
maternity leave policies. See, e.g., Amster v. Bd. of Educ., 55 Misc.2d 961, 286,
N.Y.S.2d 687 (1967), in which the court upheld a regulation requiring female
teachers to remain at home for six months after the birth of a child.42 See note 27 supra.
43 326 F. Supp. 1208, 1213-14 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
44 La Fleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 1972).
45 Id. at 1187.
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or child.46 In light of these facts, the pregnant teachers had been
unjustly singled out for special treatment.47
The court did not conclude its opinion there, however, but con-
tinued with a brief discussion of sex-based classifications in general,
48
noting the recent trend of decisions49 overturning them. At no point,
however, did the court state that the applicable standard of review
in matters of sex discrimination was the compelling state interest
test.
In fact, the Sixth Circuit Court never clearly stated what standard
it was adopting. Since the existing maternity regulation might ease
administrative burdens (according to the Circuit Court,)50 strict ad-
herence to the McGowan-Doud standard, practiced by the court
below and recommended by the appellate dissent,51 would have
necessitated affirmation of the trial court's holding. It is apparent,
then, that the old reasonable basis test tends to perpetuate a status
quo, sustaining regulations no longer relevant to the social conscience.
In overturning the school board regulation, therefore, the Circuit
Court moved away from the traditional equal protection standard,
coming closer to the compelling state interest test without adopting
it. Only time will tell whether the Sixth Circuit really espouses the
"new reasonable basis test" or the compelling state interest test 5 2
Nevertheless, whichever test the Sixth Circuit ultimately endorses, its
decision in La Fleur will continue to stand as an extension of the
coverage of the equal protection clause.
Limiting somewhat the significance of that decision, as the Sixth
Circuit Court itself recognized, is the recent amendment extending
coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196453 to states and
46 Id. at 1187.
47Id. at 1188.
48 Id.
sod. at 1187.
51 Id. at 1190, citing McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802,
809 (1969), which states:
The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative
of the Equal Protection Clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated
to the pursuit of that goal .... [C]lassifications will be set aside only if
no grounds can be conceived to justify them.
2In light of its recent decision in Johnson v. Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796, 798
(6th Cir. 1971), it is improbable that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
implied an endorsement of the compelling state interest test in its La Fleur decision.
53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1971). See Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 H~nv. L. REv.
1109 (1971); Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An Attempt to Interpret
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DurE L.J. 671; Oldham, Questions
of Exclusions and Exceptions Under Title VI-"Sex-Plus" and the BFOQ, 23
HAST. L.J. 55 (1971). See also Ky. REv. STAT. ch. 344 (1971).
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state agencies, and eliminating the exemption of individuals employed
in "educational activities of non-religious educational institutions."54
Title VII does not prohibit all employment distinctions based on sex,
but rather requires that any which are made be backed by a com-
pelling interest. Under this "bona fide occupational qualification"
exception, 55 the burden of proof rests on the employer wishing a
sex-based classification upheld.
In the spring of 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission 5 issued a revised set of guidelines more clearly and specifically
indicating the permissible scope of sex-based discrimination by em-
ployers.5 7 Therein, the Commission for the first time categorically
stated that exclusions from employment due to pregnancy would
constitute prima facie violations of Title VII and that disabilities due
to pregnancy and childbirth should be treated on the same terms as
any other temporary disability. 8
While the authority of the EEOC guidelines and decisions is
persuasive, it is not mandatory that the courts follow those rulings.5 9
Title VII, however, is the law, and several courts have acknowledged
federal intention to preempt the field of discriminatory employment
54 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 STAT. 103 (1972).
5542 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th
Cir. 1969); Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Pa.
1971); Ridinger v. Gen. Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1969);
Cheatwood v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 803 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969);
Richard v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 388 (D. Or. 1969).
5642 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) authorizes establishment of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, whose duties are mainly educational and pro-
motional. The Commission can undertake studies, collaborate with state and local
agencies, and attempt to conciliate labor disputes insofar as these actions will
further the purposes of this act. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 et seq. (1970).
For Presidential efforts at implementing equal employment goals, see Exec.
Order No. 11,375, 3 Fed. Reg. 684 (1967), amending Exec. Order No. 11,246,
3 Fed. Reg. 839 (1965); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1969).
For an overview of discriminatory practices throughout the country, see U.S.
Department of Labor pamphlets: Laws on Sex Discrimination in Employment
(1970); UCLA Conference: Sex Discrimination in Employment Practice (1969);
and Weightlifting Provisions for Women by State (1969).
57 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission-Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 87 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972).
58 Id. at 6838. Prior to establishing these guidelines, the EEOC had ruled
on a number of employment controversies involving maternity rules. See, e.g.,
EEOC Decision No. 71-308 (1970), CCH Employment Practices Guide (herein-
after EPG) ff 6170; Decision No. 70-495 (1970), EPG ff 6110; Decision, Case No.
LA 68-4-538E (1969), EPG 11 6125; Decision No. 70-360 (1969), EPG ff 6084
(1969.2 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970). See also Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984, 989 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Hecks v. Crown Zellerbach
Corp., 49 F.R.D. 184, 191 (E.D. La. 1968), term. in part and reaff'd in part, 321
F. Supp. 1241 (E.D. La. 1968); Int'l Chem. Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co.,
259 F. Supp. 365, 366-67 (N.D. Miss. 1966).
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practices. 60  Nevertheless, Kentucky's Attorney General takes the
position:
[UIntil the Supreme Court of the United States rules otherwise,
Kentucky statutes, which limit the number of hours [and] periods
of work of women. . serve a legitimate purpose and recognition
of the biological and psychological differences between the sexes
and do not conflict with or violate the Federal Civil Rights Act
of 1964, and, in fact, fall within the exceptions of the act under
"bona fide occupational qualifications." 61
Although no court has yet overturned any Kentucky statute on
the grounds of a violation of Title VII, the numerous decisions over-
turning similar statutes in other states, including ones within the
Sixth Circuit, point to the untenable nature of the Attorney General's
opinion. Whether under a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or a 42 U.S.C. § 2000
action, Kentucky must soon face the fact that the day of equal op-
portunity for women has arrived, and school boards,62 in particular,
will have to recognize that teachers "in the family way" have a right
to remain in the classroom.
ADDENDUM
By mid-December, it had become apparent that the La Fleur
decision would be recognized in Kentucky. At that time, the Fayette
County School Board announced its new maternity leave policy, based
on the principle that the decision to continue teaching during
pregnancy is one that should be made by the individual teacher in
conjunction with her physician.
Carole A. Masters
60 LaBlanc v. S. Tel. & Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971);
Ridinger v. Gen. Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
61 1969 Ky. Op. A-r'y GEN. 334.
62 See, e.g., Fayette County Board of Education Policy § 24 (amended
effective 9/20/71), which states in part:
Maternity leave must be requested in time to become effective at least
four (4) months before the estimated date of confinement. Estimate time
of confinement must be certified to the Division of Personnel Services
by the attending physician.
A teacher on maternity leave may return to active duty three (3) months
after delivery upon the written recommendation of the attending physi-
cian, provided the date said teacher is eligible to return to duty is con-
sistent with the opening of a new school term or at any time during a
school term provided there is a vacancy for which said teacher is
qualified.
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